THE PERSIAN WARS |
*inter-war period: preparation and developments in Persia and Greece
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The INTERWAR PERIOD 490BC - 480BC
There are a series of events that are crucial to understanding what is known as the Second Persian Invasian of 480-479BC. As it is a nice and neat 10 years between the Marathoin Campaign and Xerxes' Invasion of 480BC. 19th and 20th century historians have classified this period of 10 years as the INTERWAR PERIOD. During this time it is easy to look at the era in terms of GREEK and PERSIAN preparatios for futher conflict, for, it is clear that Persia cannot let the failed campaign of 490BC in capturing Athens pass without retribution. Conversely the Greeks now aware of Persian intentions to subjugate as many cities as possible in the Greek mainland had to expect further inavsions as a likely outcome.
Take into consideration that the following summary of preparations span over a significant period of time. 10 years after all, is a long time even in the modern sense in regards to how our understanding of conflict and wars develop. Each example, can be separated by years between it and the next development. There is also the consideration of geopolitics and how Persia for example, needed to focus its attention towards ALL of the territiories of its empire, not just Greece. Typically, Athens during this period was faced with intense power struggles for leadership, engaged in a war with her commercial rival, Aegina, and was involved in a naval policy. The rest of Greece has no plans or notions of pan-Hellenism or a common struggle, yet they need to unite as exampled by the last ditch efforts of 481BC - when Persian was already well on their campaign trail. Meanwhile, the Persians were reeling from a defeat in 490BC, compounded by the death of Darius in 486BC and the problems of succession / troublesome revolts that must be suppressed before any expansion in the western territories can be made possible. |
Establishing the period
Issues of the 10 year gap The Greeks The Persians |
A very straight forward summary from an old documentary. The film was called THE SPARTAN WARS - a little bias shown here, the entire film was about the Greco-Persian Wars and balanced attention on both Athens and Sparta - but that's the way to sell a documentary! Call it SPARTAN!
Click here : LINK :to view |
PERSIAN PREPARATIONS |
GREEK PREPARATIONS |
Bridging the Hellespont
Stablishing supply depots Bridging the Strymon River Digging a canal at Mt Athos Recruiting an army Leadership |
This was the greatest of Xerxes’ engineering feats. There were two floating bridges, in two places, constructed across the Hellespont from Asia to Europe. These were approximately 1.4 kilometres long, one made by the Phoenicians with flax cables and another by the Egyptians using papyrus cables. After a violent storm smashed the bridges and carried them away, two more had to be built.
Carefully selected sites along the coast of Thrace and Macedonia were used as provision ‘dumps’ for enormous quantities of grain and salt meat. These were not only meant to feed the army and animals in transit, but to draw on, as the army moved further and further into hostile country. Some of these already existed from previous campaigns. The great Strymon River was bridged near its mouth, a task Xerxes entrusted to the Phoenicians and Egyptians. This was undertaken in view of the previous disaster to the fleet off Mt Athos and preparations had been underway for the previous three years. The canal through the rocky promontory was 4 kilometres long and was dug by men from the various nations who were sent over in shifts and put to work under the lash. Herodotus believed it was not really necessary and that it was mere ostentation that made Xerxes build it, as he wanted to leave something by which to be remembered. Xerxes, in the process of assembling his armies, had every corner of the continent ransacked. This continued for four years, and there was not a nation in Asia that he did not take with him against the Greeks. The coastal provinces provided horse transports, crews, warships, boats for floating bridges and other naval craft. Herodotus, in his usual manner, exaggerated the numbers. He believed that the forces were in the vicinity of 3 million, but modern estimates range from 50 000–200 000, 75 000 animals, and 500–800 warships, plus horse transports, supply ships and boats to act as floating bridges. Unlike Darius, Xerxes led the forces himself and the Persians, Medes and Cissians made up the core of the infantry, of which 10 000 were the famous Persian Immortals, referred to as such because their number was always maintained at 10 000. The royal family and court nobles featured in the expedition, with five of Xerxes’ own sons among the 30 generals. |
Athens vs Aegina
Athenian democracy Congress at the Ithsmus 481BC Greek hegemony Consultation of the Delphic Oracle |
Aegina was the strongest naval power in the Aegean at this time and relations between Aegina and Athens had been poor for some time. The Spartan King, Cleomenes, took ten hostages from Aegina and gave them to Athens. This was enough to prevent Aegina openly siding with the Persians. The death of the Spartan King, Cleomenes, in c.489 B.C.E. changed things. Tit for tat reprisals between the two cities continued for some years.
The key developments in the 480s included: the increasing use of ostracism, the lessening important of the position of archon, the growing importance of the position of strategoi. The growing importance of the post of strategoi was to be crucial. Gradually, any Athenian politician of ability and energy would seek election as a strategoi if he was to have any hope of making a mark in Athenian political life. It is best seen in the Themistocles and Aristides conflict. In 481 B.C.E. a Congress of the Greek states was called which met on the isthmus separating the Corinthian Gulf from the Saronic Gulf. • Presided over by Sparta The Hellenic League decided that any Greek state which voluntarily medised would be tithed (i.e. its wealth would be confiscated and a tenth given to the god at Delphi). • There were 31 Greek states at the Congress by absent were the norther states. • They knew that they would bear the brunt of an early Persian attack and they did not want to commit themselves until they were sure Greek forces, especially Spartan, were going to be sent north to protect them. There was the question of leadership to be considered. Spartan leadership of the land forces was automatic. However, there was jealousy of growing Athenian power and the Greek states would only accept Spartan naval leadership. Athens yielded to this. The Athenians approached the Delphic Oracle for advice. The oracle advised Athens not to resist Persia. Not happy with this, the Oracle was approached a second time. This time its advice was more cryptic, as was usually the case with oracular announcements. This message from the oracle confused the Athenians - "behins the wooden walls" • Older men said that the wall referred to the ancient fence around the Acropolis. • Themistocles argued differently and said it referred to Athens' fleet. |
Themistocles' NAVAL POLICY
Themistocles was the most brilliant and innovative leader of Athens, with the possible exception of Pericles, during the fifth century,
He served at Marathon and realised that despite Athens' victory the danger from Persia was not past, and that Marathon was simply 'the beginning of far greater conflicts'. He believed that when the Persians came in greater force the only way to defeat them would be to cut off their supply lines by defeating them at sea. Also, he knew that Athens' future lay with the sea, as no army could hope to compete with Sparta. The development of a strong Athenian navy would also help in the war with Aegina. For the implementation of his naval policy he needed more warships than Athens had, but he was opposed by Aristides and the wealthy, landowning hoplite class, who saw that the lower classes as rowers in a fleet would increase in status, and that the wealthy would be responsible for maintaining the warships Aristides opposed Themistocles as he 'was constantly introducing sweeping reforms and inciting the people to fresh enterprises' and at the same time 'checking and obstructing him at every step in the business of government' - Plutarch. The two politicians faced each other in the assembly over the question of what to do with the surplus produce of the silver mines at Laurium, where an unprecedentedly rich vein had recently been discovered. It was proposed that the surplus be shared out among the Athenians at a rate of 10 dr achmas a man, but Themistocles was able to persuade the assembly to use the money to build 100 new triremes (Herodotus says 200). In his arguments he did not stress the need for a navy to face the danger of the Persians, but played on the anger felt by the Athenians against the Aeginetans. As Herodotus comments, 'the outbreak of this war [with Aegina] at that moment saved Greece by forcing Athens to become a maritime power'. By careful use of propaganda, Themistocles was able to persuade the people to ostracise Aristides, and the ships were built. Thus the navy, which ultimately was not used against Aegina, was at the disposal of Greece in her hour of need. |
Silver found @ Laurium - Location is the promontory SE of Athens.
YouTube content creators = "KINGS & GENERALS" - really top quality research and sharp, modern graphics. MUST WATCH ...ENJOY!
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MODERN HISTORIOGRAPHY
R.A. Sealey, "A History of the Greek City States 700-338 BC
On the Hellenic League Sealey makes the point that the Hellenic League did not represent the existence of an emergent nation. The League was merely a collection of sovereign states that had come together at the time of temporary danger. The evidence of this is that significant differences still appeared between the states at this time. Even medism was not deemed a serious crime until after the invasion, argues Sealey. "...The reasons why many Greeks allied in 481 BC to resist the invasion must be sought in the particular circumstances of those cities, not in any general recognition of Persia as a national enemy..." |
Victor Ehrenberg - "From Solon to Socrates"
On Xerxes and his campaign Ehrenberg presents a more complex image of Xerxes than the ancient Greek sources tend to offer. Herodotus and Aeschylus present Xerxes as a pathetic wretch. Aeschylus, in his play "The Persians", is particularly hard on Xerxes. Later Greek liked to present Xerxes as a fool and an overbearing megalomanic. Ehrenberg sees him as rather more than that. "...he could be cruel, but also magnanimous...But he was impetuous and overconfident, perhaps even conceited, as a man in his thirties with power and success might easily be..." |
Paul Cartledge - The Ancients Podcast: The Battle of Thermopylae
On Spartna Leadership Cartledge asserts that the Spartans were already head of Peloponesian League and that Athens was already a crucial part of the naval defense of Greece. However he describes that the of the 32 or 33 states who agreed to resist the Persians, 15 of them had already accepted Spartan military leadership in the Pelopponesian league. "Long before Themopylae and Xerxes, the Spartans were already leaders of a Peloponesian alliance, and it is important to note that it is extraordinary that they were goin to be involved at all as it was the Athenians who had provoked the Persians and not Sparta. Athens was more than agreeable to Spartan involvment and leadership." |